Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 37
Number 4 Symposium: Social Justice in the
21st Century

Article 6

3-1-2004

Chasing the Wind: Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming Legal
Mis-Education, and Engaging in Professional Re-Socialization
John O. Calmore

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John O. Calmore, Chasing the Wind: Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming Legal Mis-Education, and
Engaging in Professional Re-Socialization, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1167 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol37/iss4/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

"CHASING THE WIND": PURSUING SOCIAL
JUSTICE, OVERCOMING LEGAL
MIS-EDUCATION, AND ENGAGING IN
PROFESSIONAL RE-SOCIALIZATION
John 0. Calmore*

We believe that a subtle process of professionalization
occurs during law school without being addressed or even
acknowledged. This learning by inadvertence means that
the participants often fail to consider fundamental
questions about the identity
they are assuming, and its
1
relation to their values.
In simple terms, a fully-socialized individual is one who is,
does, and believes pretty
much what society asks him or her
2
to be, do and believe.
Lawyers and activists seeking socialjustice operate within
systemic constraints,
while seeking to push the boundaries
3
of those constraints.

* Reef C. Ivey II Research Professor of Law, School of Law, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The title, "Chasing the Wind," is taken from

NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN

THE COMMON LAW STATE (2003).

I use the title to suggest that the pursuit of

social justice is difficult, but that it is imperative to succeed because it can
blow away the pollution of injustice if we properly harness it.
1. ELIZABETH DvoRKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 1 (1981).
2. GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS:
MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 11 (1978).
3. MARTHA R. MAHONEY, JOHN 0. CALMORE, & STEPHANIE M.
WILDMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 5

(2003).
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the fall of 2003, when prospects for the Democratic
Party's presidential nominee were relatively open, candidates
Howard Dean and John Edwards each promised that if elected, he
would hold a summit on social justice within ninety days of taking
office.4
While I am not suggesting that either candidate is
necessarily a role model for social justice, I think the fact that each
took the initiative to address this topic is very important.
I think it should be very important to members of the bench and
bar. Yet, I wonder if the law students we train would bring from
their legal education much to contribute that would be particularly
intelligent or insightful. I wonder if their "learning by inadvertence"
forces them to adopt a professional identity that unduly limits their
way of envisioning and experiencing law and lawyering to
something that, more often than not, is divorced from social justice.
In their professional socialization, is their perceived role as lawyers
distorting their sense of humanity and their own values in ways that
would render them mute if such a summit on social justice were to
occur?
As we educate them "by inadvertence," far too many students
are learning the wrong lessons to become competent social justice
lawyers. Those who seek to learn the appropriate lessons must also
resist-not assimilate-the efforts to fully socialize them into the
legal profession. What I describe, in simple terms, as "the fully
socialized individual" will be of no help in seeking social justice for
those who are marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented.
Thus, it is important for students to challenge the ways of their
(mis)education and to examine their entry into the systems of law,
lawyers, and politics-reinforcing systems that will constrain their
identity and efforts to give material meaning to the high ideals of this
nation's vision of democracy where "[11ife, [1]iberty, and the
[p]ursuit of [h]appiness" really are inalienable rights, where the
"consent of the governed" really is the source of legitimated
governmental power, and where all of us are not just "created equal"
but are enabled to demonstrate it.

4. Holly Ramer, Edwards, Dean Vow Focus on Social Justice, HERALD-

SUN (Durham, N.C.), Oct. 20, 2003, at C9.
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Moreover, I think that students who aspire to engage in social
justice advocacy cannot learn all they need to know within the
classroom, because "[s]ocial justice lawyering envisions the practice
of law both on behalf of and alongside of subordinated peoples, with
the efforts and achievements of members of the community [as] a
crucial aspect of the work.",5 The course in social justice lawyering
must try to do primarily two things: (1) increase the capacity of
students and (2) develop the inclination of students to participate in
advancing the social justice agenda.
As a final introductory caveat, I have chosen to characterize the
legal advocacy to be advanced by this discussion as "social justice
lawyering." I have done so, not only because justice is our primary
aspirational norm, but also because I want to step away from the
increasingly overinclusive label of "public interest law." In the early
1970s the prevalent characterization of public interest law was
associated with leftist, liberal to progressive advocacy in such areas
as poverty law, civil liberties, and civil rights. 6
Today, however, conservative and reactionary advocates have
effectively rearticulated and redeployed the term "public interest."
These advocates now oppose many of the causes that the earlier
public interest lawyers sought to advance. 7 According to Michael
Omi and Howard Winant, the term "rearticulation," as used here,
refers both to process and to practice.8 First, it refers to redefining
political interests and identities through a process of recombining
familiar ideas and values in hitherto unrecognized ways. Second, the
term "rearticulation" refers to a practice of discursive reorganization
or reinterpretation of ideological themes and interests already present
in the subjects' consciousness, such that these elements obtain new

5. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.
6. NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN
THE 1980s AND BEYOND 4 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms
of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 737, 771-74 (2002) (discussing
the mission statements of such conservative public interest law firms as the

Washington Legal Foundation, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, the
Pacific Legal Foundation, and the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation).
8. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 163 n.8 (2d ed. 1994).

1170

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1167

meanings or coherence. 9 Through both this process and practice, the
political right has rearticulated the term "public interest law" and it
now often resides in a domain that is hostile to the interests of social
justice.
Right-wing advocates and legal organizations now effectively
block progressive social change and transformation along many
fronts.' ° All too often these repressive advocates claim to be public
interest lawyers, but their political commitments and professional
responsibilities are directed away from the social justice aspirations
that are reflected in the work considered throughout this Article. In
my activism, scholarship, and teaching, I try to reinforce and
advance that work in a way that is clearly identified as social justice
lawyering, something that will not be so easily highjackedrearticulated, if you will-by repressive forces. As we expressed in
our textbook on social justice,
While fine work for social justice continues to take place
through public interest law firms and public interest
organizations, the broad term "public interest law" no
longer fully captures either the commitment to work on
behalf of marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented
clients and communities or the value placed on
transformation that characterizes lawyering for social
justice. 11
Within this worrisome context, in Part II, I provide some of my
reflections on how the formal matriculation process in law school
tends not only to sharpen the mind by narrowing it, but also to
miseducate students who" seek to advance a social justice agenda.
Part III examines professional socialization of law students as a
constraint to social justice lawyering. I argue that re-socialization is
imperative for students to break free of dominant understandings and
orientations that channel law students away from the values and
orientations that should drive social justice lawyering. In Part IV, I
9. Id. at 195 n.11.
10. Many of these legal organizations are well-funded and wedded in their
advocacy to think tanks and foundations that push a conservative-reactionary
agenda. JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How
CONSERVATIVE

THINK TANKS AND

SOCIAL AGENDA, at ix, 3-5 (1996).
11. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note

FOUNDATIONS

3, at 4-5.

CHANGED AMERICA'S
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briefly sketch a political map from progressive to reactionary terrain
to explore the interplay between politics and social justice lawyering.
There, I suggest that progressive social justice lawyers must
simultaneously struggle with the liberal left, pushing its envelope and
effectively operating within its constraints when necessary, and
vigorously oppose the right-wing politics of conservatives and
reactionaries. Moreover, social justice lawyers must pay strategic
attention to the political center, pulling it left and keeping it from
falling to the right. Part V looks at social justice lawyering as a
movement that can reverse the phenomenon of preservation-through
-transformation 12 by engaging in "third-dimension lawyering"' 13 and
by filing "think complaints" in federal court.1 4

Finally, Part VI

addresses the challenges and opportunities of lawyering with social
movements, a critical aspect of transformative change.
II. REFLECTIONS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE MIS-EDUCATION OF
LAW STUDENTS

15

As Donald Sch6n has argued convincingly, the best practitioners
in various professions develop their skills through continual
reflection about the uncertainties, complexity, and value conflicts
that confront them in practice situations.1 6 Sch6n calls this having "a

12. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1113 (1997).

13. See Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on
Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 699.

14. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of
Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 836-49 (1995).
15. My teaching, scholarship, and advocacy have sharpened my ability to
engage in reflection which may not necessarily demonstrate either critical or
creative thinking, but which enables me to probe beneath the surface of
problems, to think more deeply about issues, and, at the end of the day, to
know myself better. So the word "reflections" here is deliberate.
16. See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How
PROFESsIONALS

THINK

IN

ACTION

(1993)

[hereinafter SCHON, How

PROFESSIONALS THINK]; DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE

PRACTITIONER (1987); Donald A. Sch~n, Educating the Reflective Legal
Practitioner,2 CLINICAL L. REV. 231 (1995). Richard Neumann reviews
Sch6n's works in Richard K. Neumann, Donald Schon, the Reflective
Practitioner,and the ComparativeFailuresof Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L.

REV. 401 (2000).
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'reflective conversation with the situation."' 1 7 Such a conversation is
not detached, away from the action; it is not time-out meditation.
Rather, "the reflection ... takes place in the midst of action,.., and
it need not employ the medium of words .... The term conversation
is, in this usage, metaphorical. It does not refer to a literal
conversation about the situation, but to an18 inquirer's conversationlike transaction with the materials at hand."'
Moreover, as Richard Neumann observes, "[p]art or all of this
[reflection] might be unconscious."' 9 I try, however, to develop an
ability to conscientiously, deliberately converse with the situation of
social injustice as I try to develop a teaching and learning style that
counters it.
An effective professional must do this. How?
According to Sch6n: "Much reflection-in-action hinges on the
experience of surprise. When intuitive, spontaneous performance
yields nothing more than the results expected for it, then we tend not
to think about it. But when intuitive performance leads to surprises,
pleasing and promising or unwanted, we may respond by reflecting20
in-action.,
Relatedly, J.P. Ogilvy urges students to adopt a more reflective
attitude to assist them in developing "reflective judgment," which is
"a process of critical inquiry and evaluation that recognizes our
knowledge of reality is subject to our own perceptions and
interpretations, but that nevertheless permits us to determine that
some judgments are more correct than others.",2 1 I believe this is true,
but I do not intend to speak with any self-righteousness or undue
arrogance. I simply write to share with you a few insights and
experiences as I reflect on social justice lawyering.
Students can become both overwhelmed and depressed by the
current prospects for viable social justice lawyering. I emphasize
acknowledging the constraints, operating realistically within those
constraints when one must, but transgressing them whenever
possible. The students constantly wrestle with questions about the
17. Neumann, supra note 16, at 406 (quoting SCHON, How PROFESSIONALS
THINK, supra note 16, at 268).
18. Id. (omissions in original).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 406-07 (quoting SCHON, How PROFESSIONALS THINK, supra note
16, at 56).
21. J.P. Ogilvy, The Use of Journals in Legal Education: A Tool for
Reflection, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 55, 76 (1996).
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need to re-socialize and step outside the box of the conventional
matriculation process as they learn of the difficulty of framing
demands for social justice as claims for legal rights; as they face the
challenges of joining community struggles of marginalized,
subordinated, and underrepresented individuals and groups; as they
are challenged to somehow overcome their privilege and connect on
a human level with others unlike themselves in many regards; as they
learn to accept a less heroic role than they may have imagined-well
you get the idea: This teaching and learning-this work-ain't easy.
Yet, I am gratified beyond literal description by how students
firm up their commitment during the course I teach, by how they
become so sophisticated and walk away thinking that they simply
know more than the students who are limiting themselves to the
traditional curriculum or who are preoccupied with taking all the bar
courses. It confirms for me Schbn's argument that professional
education must be developed through what he calls "deviant
traditions of education for practice-traditions that stand outside or
alongside the normative (regular) curricula., 22 The regular courses,
primarily focused on doctrinal analysis, provide information but fail
to develop professional thinking, skills, and sensibilities.
Thus, Fran Quigley observes that as law students engage in
learning opportunities that emphasize the importance of the social
setting that shapes the practice of law and issues of justice, they
move away from the Langdellian model of legal instruction, one that
views the concept of law as "reason based, abstract, and value free,
and thus best studied in a detached and scientific method.' 23 This
form of legal instruction ignores the impact of social and political
factors on law and provides a picture of the legal system and the
lawyer's role within it as naive, or worse, very misleading. In order
to have a more sophisticated adult learning experience, one must
consider social and political context.
There, however, especially if the context is one of social
injustice, a student is likely to experience a disorienting moment "in
which prior conceptions of social reality and justice are unable to
22. Neumann, supra note 16, at 414 (quoting SCHON, EDUCATING THE
supra note 16, at 15).
23. Fran Quigley, Seizing the DisorientingMoment: Adult Learning Theory
and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV.
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER,

37, 39 (1995).
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explain the clients' situations, thus providing what adult learning
theory holds is the beginning stage of real transformation."1 4 Most
importantly, critical reflection is an important tool to help
professionals focus on justice. Students can become informed that
beyond thinking like a lawyer in the narrow legal sense, they must
also engage in creative, reflective, and strategic thinking. Hence,
Jane Aiken suggests a way to gain insight and knowledge from
disorienting moments by identifying and exposing various
assumptions that she characterizes as paradigmatic, prescriptive, and
causal.25
While I am no longer an attorney who represents clients, I liken
my critical pedagogy to that of a reflective practitioner. As a social
justice worker, I sense I am not alone and that our time is coming. In
the preface to our book, we state that the book is born of its historic
context, and in truth its time has come: "Community activists and
lawyers across the nation have worked together for transformative
social change. Members of the legal academy-in classrooms and
clinics-have sought to teach about social justice in law schools
because students want to know how they can work with people who
most need them." 26 As I reflect on my interaction with students, I
see that this is indeed correct. I see that students in my social justice
lawyering class and critical race theory seminar-even in my torts
classes-have a serious interest in, if not yet a commitment to, social
justice.
In my social justice lawyering class I tell my students that what
they are learning puts them ahead of the curve. The concern for
social justice is real and it is growing and spreading. Indicative of
this, I did a Westlaw search at the end of the year 2003. My query
was the term "social justice." My database was TP-All, primarily
legal journals. I found 49 entries before 1970, 85 before 1980, and
785 before 1990. After 1990, there were 6,705 entries. In writing
24. Id. at 46.
25. Jane H. Aiken, ProvocateursforJustice, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 287, 29899 (2001). According to Aiken: "[P]aradigmatic assumptions are perhaps the
most difficult to pin down because they are the very structural assumptions we
use to put our experience into fundamental categories. Many times we see
these assumptions as merely facts, the way things are." Id. at 299. If we
identify paradigmatic assumptions, we can more easily remedy resistance to
clients and assist in the development of case theories.
26. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 3, at iii.
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the book with Stephanie and Marnie, I was amazed at how much
really good material there was that directly addressed social justice
issues by name. I think one of the values of the book is that it may
help to develop a concentrated study of social justice-not as part of
abstract jurisprudence, but, rather, as serious work to transform the
lives of marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented people.
Iris Young views social justice as deriving from "the
institutional conditions for promoting self-development and selfdetermination of a society's members. 27 While there is no one
vision of social justice, I would add that it promotes the collective
self-development and self-determination for many of our
communities that experience oppression, exploitation, exclusion, and
the denial of human dignity.
For the New World Foundation ("NWF"), the task is to build
social movements that shift the balance of power toward democracy
and justice.28 I believe that social justice addresses both the issues of
identity politics and of the political economy. Yet, however we
address group rights and subordination, we must always keep our
eyes on the prize of improving material conditions, dismantling
structural inequality, disrupting systemic oppressions, and
redistributing wealth. We must create more egalitarian institutions
and we must erode illegitimately held privilege. We must stop
considering today and tomorrow as the same time.
I think that Judith Shklar is absolutely correct that only by
understanding the face of injustice can we understand its counterpart,
justice. 29 As Ireflect on my professional life over the last 30 yearsas Legal Services attorney, law professor and legal scholar, program
officer at the Ford Foundation-I think that social justice work must
primarily alter the opportunity-denying circumstances, systems, and
structures of oppression and inequality. Thus redress will go beyond
justice in general or basic rights claims. It will evoke substantive
rather than merely formal equality. It will go beyond merely issues
of just distribution and issues of allocation, however important they

27. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 33

(2000).

28. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
29. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 15-16 (1990).
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may be.
It is important to think of "social justice" as
"simultaneously distributional and relational. 3 °
As I think about injustice and fight for social justice I am most
worried about those who are nakedly oppressed, who are at risk of
living out their lives as "static, limited, and expendable., 31 Beyond
exploiting people, our nation is writing people off with no more
concern than the tax accountant writes off a business loss. Ira
Goldenberg argues that under these circumstances, the oppressed
person and society may be spatially connected but psychologically
32
separate, living in worlds that are parallel but not reciprocal:
Oppression, in short, is a condition of being in which one's
past and future meet in the present-and go no further. To
be oppressed is to be rendered obsolete almost from the
moment of birth, so that one's experience of oneself is
always contingent on an awareness of just how poorly one
approximates the images that currently dominate society.3 3
We must intervene to alter these circumstances of containment
and expendability. The social justice plate is full and the tent is big.
Hence we must, as Mari Matsuda teaches, keep our eyes open to
opportunities to activate coalition building, collaboration initiatives,
and inclusion strategies. 34 Matsuda explains:
The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms
of subordination is through a method I call "ask the other
30. According to David Smith,
The term social justice is taken to embrace both fairness and equity in
the distribution of a wide range of attributes, which need not be
confined to material things. Although the primary focus is on
attributes which have an immediate bearing on people's lives, our
conception of social justice goes beyond patterns of distribution,
general and spatial, to incorporate attributes relevant to how these
come about. While fairness is sometimes applied to procedures and

justice to outcomes, we are concerned with both. Preference for the
term social justice rather than justice in general is explained not by
preoccupation with the distribution of attributes which might be
labeled as social, but by concern with something which happens
socially, among people in a society.
DAVID SMITH, GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 26 (1994).
31. IRA GOLDENBERG, OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL INTERVENTION

32. Id.
33. Id.

2 (1978).

34. Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory

Out of Coalition,43 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1991).
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question." When I see something that looks racist, I ask,
"Where is the patriarchy in this?" When I see something
that looks sexist, I ask, "Where is the heterosexism in this?"
When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask,
"Where are the class interests in this?" Working in
coalition forces us to look for both the obvious and nonobvious relationships of domination, helping us to realize
that no form of subordination ever stands alone. If this is
true,. . . then isn't it also true that dismantling any one form
of subordination is impossible without dismantling every
other?35
III. PROFESSIONAL SOCIALIZATION AS A CONSTRAINT ON SOCIAL
JUSTICE LAWYERING

Law students and advocates committed to social justice
lawyering often need to question, if not challenge, the dominant
understandings that drive their professional socialization, a process
that begins immediately upon entering law school. Many law
students fail to recognize that this socialization and the values that it
inculcates are part of a system of laws, lawyers, and politics: "We
are generally not socialized to understand systems as systems, to
analyze how they actually work and their consequences. Instead, we
come to understand systems as a taken-for-granted reality that is
simply as it seems to be." 36 But to me, things-"taken-for-granted
reality"--are not as they should seem. There is too much injustice in
the world and too little effort, especially by lawyers, to correct it.
Traditional law study, both in terms of course offerings and
teaching methodology, may detract from learning the lessons of
social justice. Because law school is part of the socialization process
for the legal profession, developing a commitment to social justice
requires a re-socialization. Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton focus on
these interrelated concepts to explain socialization:
[R]ole-a socially generated set of expectations about
one's behavior in specific situations; reference group-the
audience (or audiences) to whom one looks for approval,
35. Id. at 1189.
36. ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY: A
USER'S GUIDE TO SOCIOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING 267 (1995).
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support, acceptance, reward and sanction; and ideologythe constellation of beliefs, knowledge, and ideas which, in
a given situation, serve to justify, legitimate and explain
both role definitions and the allocation of reward and
sanction power among reference groups.3 7
For those students who are unwilling to go along with program,
they must conscientiously interrogate all three of these conceptsrole definitions, reference groups, and ideology-as they
contribute to the development of a distinct legal subculture that
influences the "professionalization" of students becoming
lawyers.
Like every social system, the system of lawyers depends upon
people who are motivated to perform the various roles that it
encompasses. Thus, professional socialization describes a process by
which we learn to become members of our profession through
internalizing the norms and values of the profession, and also by
learning what our roles are and how to perform those roles. Because
professional socialization is not fixed, however, but continues
throughout our professional lives, it is therefore possible to carve out
norms, values, roles, and behaviors that are well suited to working to
secure justice. This is the great opportunity to save the fireboat
before it sinks.
Conceptually, as Aiken suggests, for instance, educators can
work to cultivate among students "a justice readiness" and to ensure
that the future lawyers we are training have an appreciation for
justice.38 In teaching social justice lawyering, I hope to inspire law
students to use their legal skills to bring about a more just society.
As Elizabeth Dvorkin and colleagues point out, "the search for
competence can lead lawyers and law students to become constricted
by the roles and patterns of thinking they have 39adopted and unable to
move beyond these confines when they work.,
37. BELLOW & MOULTON, supra note 2, at 11-12.
38. Aiken, supra note 25, at 289.
39. DVORKI ETAL., supra note 1, at 2. Accordingly,
We become accultured to an unnecessarily limiting way of seeing and
experiencing law and lawyering, a way which can separate lawyers (as
well as the other actors in the legal system) from their sense of
humanity and their own values. When that separation occurs, the
profession easily becomes experienced as only a job or role, and
human problems as only legal issues. Care and responsibility yield to
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Re-socialization is necessary to militate against students
becoming cut off from their own sense of humanity, aspirations and
values, and from their responsibilities to themselves and others. The
goal of legal education must be broadened and include "the goal of
bringing together technical mastery with aspiration, intellect with
experience, rigor with value, pragmatism with idealism, competence
and skill with caring and a sense of meaning. '40 Thus, in class, we
constantly reiterate the need for students to reconcile role and
identity in a way that permits learning the craft of lawyering in a way
that is holistically tied to larger societal questions of who we are as a
people.
Although Aiken and Quigley's scholarship address challenges
that are associated with teaching clinical law students, their
observations pertain to the broader lessons of social justice
lawyering.
They also introduce working concepts that recur
throughout the course, those of "becoming justice ready" and
learning from "disorienting moments." Often becoming justice
ready entails the adult learning techniques of seizing the disorienting
moment to learn lessons of social justice. Through clinical programs
students gain experience as lawyers working toward social justice,
but Aiken questions whether we are teaching enough about social
justice simply by ensuring that students are engaged in the fight for
it. Hence, she analogizes "a justice experience" to taking a trip to
Paris: "It makes me interesting but not a Parisian. Mere exposure to
substance is insufficient to train good lawyers."41 Helping students
to become justice ready entails determining the skills and subject
matter content that will enable them to identify injustice, and
developing teaching interventions to enhance the probability that
they will acquire those skills. Aiken summarizes the developmental
process as follows:
Students come to us at varying stages in the development of
critical thinking skills that require different interventions.
exigencies and stratagems; and legal education, instead of reflecting
the aspiration and searching that embody law and lawyering, can all
too easily become an exercise in attempted mastery and growing
cynicism.
Id.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Aiken, supra note 25, at 287.
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Educational theorists have identified several developmental
stages for adult learners, which I present in a legal context.
First, the learner manifests right-wrong dualist thinking. At
this stage, students still hang on to the idea that there is a
right and wrong answer to every legal problem. The
lawyer's job is to find that answer. In the second stage of
development, critical thinking, the learner recognizes that
there are very few or no absolute answers to legal problems.
Law students at this stage believe that there is absolutely no
certainty in the law. The lawyer's job is to figure out what
the decision-maker wants and pitch legal arguments that
appeal to the decision-maker. These students understand
the important developmental step that the law is
"constructed," but they feel powerless in their ability to
make change. In the final stage of a lawyer's development
toward "justice readiness," the lawyer demonstrates an
appreciation for context, understands that legal decisionmaking reflects the value system in which it operates, and
can adapt, evaluate, and support her own analysis. At this
stage, the "justice ready" lawyer can become proactive in
shaping legal disputes with an eye toward social justice.42
At bottom, becoming justice ready entails developing a value
orientation: "At a minimum,.., those of us who dedicate ourselves
to social justice must ask ourselves if our proposed action as a lawyer
will support and increase human dignity." 43 As indicated above,
moreover, Aiken also emphasizes the importance of context: "We
must also educate our students about the obstacles they are likely to
face while seeking social justice. Therefore, understanding how
oppression manifests itself in the law is critical to the educational
process. I assume.., that oppression is pervasive, restricting,
hierarchical, complex, and internalized." 44
Understanding how oppression operates assists Aiken's students
to make sense of many of the phenomena that they experience.
Aiken says, "Many of the students in the clinic have given little or no
thought to these ideas. Soon enough they will encounter evidence of
42. Id. at 290-291.
43. Id. at 296.
44. Id. at 297.
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the effects of oppression in their case handling. '45 It is helpful to
focus our students on such questions as: "'Where do you see
resistance to the solution you seek for your client?' and 'Who
benefits if this solution is denied? ' ' ' 46 Finally, Aiken's justice ready
orientation implores one to go beyond individual cases and evaluate
the bigger picture, evaluating whether legal options offered to clients
or...
merely "reduce the intensity of [their particular] 'injustice
7
A
transformation.
social
of
strategy
long-term
a
assist in
Beyond clinical instruction, James Elkins and Richard
Wasserstrom, respectively, introduce two concepts that help define
the lawyer qua professional: the "[1]egal [p]ersona 'A8 and "role
differentiated behavior. ' 49 Elkins focuses on how being a lawyer
affects one's world view through the lens of "legalism," "'the ethical
attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following,
and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by
rules. ' ' 50 From this perspective, which is virtually at war with a
social justice lawyering orientation, one sees the world primarily in
terms of rights and obligations, liabilities, and causes of action:
'When we accuse someone of being legalistic, we suggest an
excessive zeal for purely formal details which becloud rather than
clarify the real issue. The legalist is someone who is lost among the
trees and cannot or will not consider the overall shape of the
forest. ' 51 The legal persona is tied closely to the notion of "thinking
like a lawyer, ' 52 which the venerable Harvard Law School Dean
it. 53
Erwin Griswold likened to sharpening the mind by narrowing
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 305.
48. James R. Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay of the Professional
Mask, 64 VA. L. REv. 735 (1978).
49. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTs. Q. 1 (1975).

50. Elkins, supra note 48, at 740 (quoting JUDITH N.

SHKLAR,

LEGALISM 9

(1964)).
51. Id. at 741 (quoting STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 153 (1974)).

52. Elkins, supra note 48, at 741.
53. As Elkins explains,
Simply stated, the lawyer considers himself a neutral, rational, and
objective problem solver. As a rational thinker, the lawyer perceives

client problems, clients, and self through the mist of legal rules and
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As indicated earlier, this involves a professional socialization process
that fairly well directs one, influences one to think like a lawyer and
become a lawyer, to do and believe what society asks him or her to
be, do, and believe.
Wasserstrom's classic article focuses on the role-differentiated
amorality of the lawyer's professional role. He responds to Deborah
Rhode and David Luban's basic inquiry, "To what extent can the
idea that lawyers have a role morality different from ordinary
morality be justified? 54 Students have a big problem joining their
professional roles with their personal values because they have
bought into the idea that lawyers are part of a simplified moral
universe that is often amoral. Personal moral values are baggage or
distractions that overcomplicate the task of representing clients-of
just doing their jobs.
It is convenient for lawyers and law students to inhabit a
simplified moral world that cultivates professionals who are at best
amoral technicians.55 For the system to work, "the lawyer qua
lawyer will be encouraged to be competitive rather than cooperative;
aggressive rather than accommodating; ruthless rather than
compassionate; and pragmatic rather than principled., 56
In
Wasserstrom's view, this encouraged orientation is not only part of
the logic of role-differentiated behavior of lawyers, but also, to a
lesser degree, of professionals in general.57 However, the problem
seems to be more acute among lawyers. There are personal and
social costs to be paid as result. To become a lawyer we invest so
much time and effort, experience so much stress and pressure,
become so immersed, really, in becoming a lawyer that the legal
legal problems. In essence, a lawyer's way of thinking and
representing certain events in the world consists of a dislike of vague
generalities, the structuring of all possible human relations into the
form of claims and counterclaims, and the belief that human conflicts
can be settled under established rules in a judicial proceeding.
Id. at 739-40 (citations omitted).
54. DEBORAH RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 137 (1992).
55. In adapting to the professional world, "the lawyer.., comes to inhabit a
simplified universe which is strikingly amoral-which regards as morally
irrelevant any number of factors which nonprofessional citizens might take to
be important, if not decisive, in their everyday lives." Wasserstrom, supra
note 49, at 2.
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id.
at 18.
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persona literally takes over and, in important respects, our
professional role becomes our dominant role. It dominates the roles
of spouse, father, mother, sibling, friend, and partner.
Recognizing this in 1975, Wasserstrom observed,
This is at a minimum a heavy price to pay for the
professions as we know them in our culture, and especially
so for lawyers. Whether it is an inevitable price is, I think,
an open question, largely because the problem has not
begun to be fully perceived as such by the professionals in
general, the legal profession in particular, or by the
educational institutions that train professionals.58
I firmly believe that this observation still pertains thirty years later.
Within many law schools, our most fully socialized individuals,
those who uncritically accept their professional roles as encouraged
by the system, tend to be among the highest achieving students.
They tend to aspire to the most elite positions, working for large law
firms and serving as federal judicial clerks. I am not suggesting that
those who accept these jobs and positions of influence are enemies to
social justice, but they do tend to have a harder time being
supporters. Both law school and law practice are full of rude
awakenings. Those most rudely awakened after law school are those
who were fully socialized while attending law school. A course in
social justice lawyering should be preemptive, should help students
to reduce their naivety and gain some better sense of the complicated
world they are about to enter, looking carefully at both the challenges
and opportunities.
Patrick Schiltz, a former law firm partner and current law
professor, has written a harsh critique of large law-firm practice that
helps in that effort. 59 In discussing practice in large law firms,
Schiltz discusses why lawyers give up a healthy, happy, wellbalanced life for a less healthy, less happy life dominated by work.
58. Id. at 15.
59. See Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member
of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871

(1999). Lawyers generally experience disproportionately high rates of
depression, anxiety and other mental illness, alcoholism and drug abuse,
divorce, suicide, and poor physical health, including ulcers, coronary artery
disease, and hypertension. Id. at 874-81 (citing N.C. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF
THE QUALITY OF LIFE TASK FORCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4 (1991)).
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After describing the craziness of the life style as affected by work, he
observes that lawyers do not see their lives as crazy: "Lawyers don't
see any of this. Lawyers don't sit down and think logically about
why they are leading the lives they are leading any more than buffalo
60
sit down and think logically about why they are stampeding.,
Writing directly to law students, he says, "I hope that you will sit
down and think about the life
that you want to lead before you get
61
caught up in the stampede.",
As mentioned, along with federal judicial clerkships, working
for a large law firm is the prize that most law students seek,
especially those attending top law schools.62 The rewards of status
and money await those who land a job in such a firm. Many students
who go to large firms adopt the legal persona that Elkins critiques,
and reduce the process of "thinking like a lawyer" to its narrowest
parameters in order to eliminate any basis for critically analyzing and
assessing the assumptions underlying the lawyer's peculiar view of
the world. These students are "fully socialized" and successful in
their law school matriculation. Many of these same students want to
engage in some degree of social justice lawyering, primarily through
pro bono practice while at the firm. Schiltz presents a pretty
straightforward glimpse of the traps of large-firm practice and invites
students to "[m]ake the decision now that you will be the one who
defines success for you." 63 That same invitation issues to those who
aspire to be social justice lawyers.
In my class a number of questions arise: Do students think
prestige, more than money, motivates people to exercise the option to
work for a large firm? Are social justice lawyers made to feel like
leftover lawyers-that one practices this type of law by default?
What commitments motivate one to practice social justice
60. Id. at 905.

61. Id.
62. According to Brian Leiter, from the 1991 through the 2001 Supreme
Court terms, the following law schools placed the most Supreme
Court clerks: Harvard (93), Yale (75), Chicago (50), Stanford (29), Columbia
(25), Michigan (16), Virginia (14), NYU (9), Texas (9), Duke (7),
Northwestern (7), and Berkeley (7). Supreme Court Clerkship Placements, at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings02/clerkships.html.
These
schools also supply a significant number of law professors who have clerked or

worked for large law firms. Most of these people are fully socialized.
63. Schiltz, supra note 59, at 924.
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lawyering? Do students think that in not working for a large law
firm they forego opportunities to have the most meaningful and
exciting law practice? How might the assessment of the large-firm
career choice be affected by one's identity as someone other than a
male WASP? Is there polarization between students who seek a job
in a large law firm and those who seek social justice lawyering jobs?
What is the institutional culture's support for social justice
lawyering? How effectively does the law school's placement office
support those students who want to pursue social justice lawyering?
Is the placement office preoccupied with facilitating large law-firm
interviewing and hiring?
Finally, I do not refer to Schiltz's article to indict large-firm law
practice or to make students feel uncomfortable about exercising that
option.
The observations that Schiltz makes regarding the
difficulties that large-firm practice poses to maintaining a balanced
life are not restricted to those jobs. Derrick Bell has recently written
of similar difficulties in the context of social justice lawyering. He
notes tellingly:
Although I spent substantial amounts of time with my
sons as they were growing up, I was also away a great deal,
particularly in their early years. Even when I was at home,
the long hours I spent at my desk effectively.., deterred
them from considering careers in law.
Whenever I
suggested it, their response was, "No, Dad. You work too
hard."
You work too hard. Four small words, but they packed a
punch I didn't even know I was feeling at the time. As
someone dedicated to the work of social reform and social
change, I have found it difficult to say no to more projects;
the no I didn't say usually translated into the sacrifice of
time with my family. Such trade-offs become habit.
Almost everyone on the trail of success knows the
complaint about "living to work, rather than working to
live."
What is commonly called "workaholism" can
become a serious neurosis, and yet those of us afflicted by it
tend to see it as a virtue-we certainly do not view it as
unethical conduct! Unfortunately, our passion for our work
may be real, but carried to extremes it can result in our
neglecting the people we care about most passionately.
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This, as Patrick J. Schiltz maintains, is both wrong and
unethical. 64
It is important to tell this cautionary tale. It militates against
social justice students adopting a certain self-righteousness; it warns
them to conscientiously work for balance in their own lives; it
emphasizes the need to form and advance meaningful relationships
within and without work. Bell advises,
Our relationships serve as our ethical barometers, and the
ability to participate in meaningful personal relationships,
intimate relationships, and relationships with family,
friends, and colleagues is the cornerstone of ethical living.
After all, what binds us is not blood, marriage, license, or
formal commitment, but pleasure,
caring, and the trust that
65
ethical behavior has earned.,
How has law school affected students' relationships? How much
time and attention have students devoted to advancing meaningful
relationships? How one answers these questions will help one to see
how much professional re-socialization he or she must undertake.
IV. THE POLITICAL CARTOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE LAWYERING:
FINDING YOUR PLACE

Social justice lawyering is more often than not a matter of
discovery or invention, rather than of following a clear, welldeveloped route. To get from here to there in social justice
lawyering, there is seldom a "super highway." More often, one must
travel back roads and neighborhood alleys. Yet, if we do not take
"mapping" too literally, I think it is helpful to map the system of
politics at play in social justice lawyering. With or without maps,
those of us who seek to connect theory and practice in progressive
ways must figure out how to (1) countervail the right, (2) struggle
with the liberal left even as we operate within its constraints, and (3)
work to break free of those constraints without being quixotic or
Sisyphean as we attempt to realize social justice for the
marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented. We are indeed
chasing the wind.
64. DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND
WORTH 112 (2002).

65. Id.
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In an early description of critical race theory, Kim Crenshaw
stated, "the normative stance of critical race theory is that massive
66
social transformation is a necessary precondition of racial justice."
As a normative stance, however difficult it may be to translate into
practice, this distances us from liberal fallacies that "ensure that the
steps toward justice will be small, halting, and self limiting." 67 In
Richard Abel's view, the basic fallacy of liberalism is "the belief that
it is possible to achieve equality in one 68
circumscribed realm without
inequalities.,
structural
addressing other
A principal challenge to social justice lawyering, as political
lawyering and community lawyering, is to develop an advocacy
model that is both clever and adroit, one that can effectively operate
not only within the constraints of liberalism when necessary, but also
beyond the limits of liberalism and its fallacies when possible. At
the same time, active resistance to the pressures of reactionary and
conservative forces remains the greatest challenge. Too often
progressives have failed to respond to those forces, because we have
been so diligent--overzealous, really-in critiquing liberalism.
As Peggy Davis noted at a critical race theory workshop in the
mid 1990s, this effort is daunting because when we try to say
something in our scholarship that advocates and client communities
can really use, we often find ourselves limited to "trying to solidify
an optimism about limited transformation." 69 I sense a lot of
frustration among critical, progressive scholars and those with whom
we collaborate.
That frustration, in significant part, reflects
impatience with solidifying "an optimism about limited
transformation" even though we are frequently unable to offer more.
I associate social justice lawyering with leftist, progressive
advocacy to promote individual and collective well being, enhance
human dignity, and correct imbalances of power and wealth.
66. Kimber16 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection ofRace and Sex:
A Black Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory & Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).

67. Richard Abel, Big Lies and Small Steps: A Critiqueof DeborahRhode's

Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1019, 1024 (1998).

68. Id.
69. Peggy Davis, Comments at the Panel Discussion on the Application of
Critical Race Theory to Progressive Practice, Critical Race Theory Workshop,
Philadelphia, Pa. (June 1995) (on file with author).
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Moving beyond the resolution of mere private disputes and in order
to advance group rights and attack structures and systems of
oppression and domination, social justice lawyering is, to a large
degree, political lawyering. What is the political stance and
orientation that animates such lawyering?
Students must determine where they are and where they want to
be on the basic political map that, traveling from left to right,
includes:
(1) progressive-radical; (2) liberal; (3) centrist; (4)
conservative (including neo-conservative); and (5) reactionary sites,
causes, and collective orientations. Mapping here is a fluid process
rather than making a static terrain, however. It is always a contested
work in process, which makes locating oneself difficult. Moreover,
one's location on the map may vary depending on the time and
context of one's activities, as well as on relationships of
collaboration. Political contestation revolves around the positioning
and contentions of (1) and (2) vs. (4) and (5).70 People in category
(3) tend to be influential (like swing voters in electoral politics), but
not true believers of either left or right propositions, values, etc. In
class we begin with basic mapping simply to put the categories on
the table.
A. Progressive
Webster's Dictionary defines "progressive" as "of, relating to, or
characterized by progress (advancement): devoted to or evincing
continuous improvement: making use of or interested in new ideas,
inventions, or opportunities," 71 and "one holding political
convictions based on a belief in [moderate] change designed to
improve the condition of a majority of the people and willing to use
governmental power to bring about change: one believing in change
as a desirable means of achieving specified goals. 72

70. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, REASON: WHY LIBERALS WILL WIN
THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA (2004); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN
WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION: CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA
(2004); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND
CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2000).
71. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
1813
(unabr. 1993) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY].
72. Id.
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It is virtually impossible to be a progressive lawyer in the purest
sense. 73 Progressive lawyers may be viewed as part of the "lunatic
fringe," marginalized within the profession. Often they must
compromise their ideals and settle for a less radical way of doing
business than their progressive instincts would suggest. As leftactivist lawyers, progressive lawyers "do not simply choose sides;
they aspire to politicize legal practice., 74 According to Stuart
Scheingold, "they are committed both to a transformative politics
and to a fusion of their political lives and their legal practices." 75 The
commitments go beyond do-good advocacy; "[t]he two things that
distinguish the left-activist project76 are its fundamental challenges to
the society and to the profession.,
Few law students are ready, coming to law school or graduating
from law school, to take up these challenges. They need to see, hear
from, and work with lawyers who are. During the spring of 2003,
Michael Avery, President of the National Lawyers Guild, spoke to
my social justice lawyering class. His visit was important not only
for sharing his work, but also for humanizing and legitimating the
"lunatic fringe." He discussed early advocacy efforts on behalf of
the Black Panthers while he was law student at Yale. His visit was a
highlight of the course.
Many lawyers view the National Lawyers Guild as a stronghold
of progressive lawyering. Consider the preamble to the NLG
constitution:
The National Lawyers Guild is an association dedicated to
the need for basic change in the structure of our political
and economic system. We seek to unite the lawyers, law
students, legal workers, and jailhouse lawyers of America
in an organization which shall function as an effective
political and social force in the service of the people, to the

73. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. PITT. L. REv. 125
(1968).
74. Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice:A Case
Study ofLeft-Activist Lawyering in Seattle, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
75. Id. at 119
76. Id. (citations omitted).

118 (Austin Sarat &

1190

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1167

ends that human rights shall be regarded as more sacred
than property interests. 7
B. Liberal
Both the reality and the illusion of the law's transformative
power are topics of debate as we both celebrate and lament the
progress that has been made since Brown.78 One legacy of the
Warren Court is an activation of "legal liberalism," which according
to Laura Kalman refers to "trust in the potential of courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, to bring about 'those specific social
reforms that affect large groups of people such as blacks, workers, or
women, or partisans of a particular79 persuasion; in other words, policy
change with nationwide impact."'

Most leftist lawyers are probably liberals, not progressives. In
part this may represent professional common sense. Many students
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. See generally WHAT BROWN

V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK
CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2002) [hereinafter WHAT
BROWN] (including "opinions" by Bruce Ackerman, Jack M. Balkin, Derrick

A. Bell, Drew S. Days III, John Hart Ely, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Michael
W. McConnell, Frank Michaelman, and Cass R. Sunstein). Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), represents the grandest gesture of legal
liberalism, raising issues about whether it is legitimate for the judiciary to push
for transformative social change, and what is the role of the law in advancing a
social justice agenda. In "Justice" Bell's dissenting opinion, he sharply
critiques the limits of liberal reform:
I dissent today from the majority's decision in these cases because the
detestable segregation in the public schools that the majority finds
unconstitutional is a manifestation of the evil of racism the depths and
pervasiveness of which this court fails even to acknowledge, much
less address and attempt to correct.
For reasons that I will explain in some detail, I cannot join in a
decision that, while serving well the nation's foreign policy and
domestic concerns, provides petitioners with no more than a
semblance of the racial equality that they and theirs have sought for so
long. The Court's long-overdue findings that Negroes are harmed by
racial segregation is, regrettably, unaccompanied by an understanding
of the economic, political, and psychological advantages whites gain
because of them.
WHAT BROWN, supra note 78, at 185.
79. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2
(1996).
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uncritically accept liberalism as the end point of leftist lawyering.
They see the identity of "progressive lawyer" as an oxymoron.
Indeed, Scheingold observes, "The central political contradiction of
[progressive] lawyering is that it seeks transformative goals while
working within legal processes that are wedded to the established
order."8 °
Richard Abel considers advocacy on behalf of the poor and asks:
"What can we do to promote 'equal justice under law' within the
constraints of liberalism?"'8' One of the things that distinguishes a
progressive from a liberal is the former's goal of transformation, as
opposed to the latter's goal of reform within the imperatives of the
system. Stephanie Wildman writes that the framework of democratic
liberalism, in which social justice study and practice take place,
emphasizes the individual over the community.
Within that
framework, "[w]e think in terms of individual rights, individual
achievement, individual
merit, rarely of connection, community, and
82
responsibility.,
Can one practice social justice within this liberal framework?
This question plagues liberal attorneys. Charles Lawrence addresses
how a progressive solution to the affirmative action debate would
involve a re-conceptualization of merit. The liberal defense of
affirmative action is to justify it on the basis of diversity rather than
as redress for historic wrongs. Lawrence suggests that progressive
and liberal theories are reconcilable only if activism is directed
toward transformation. 3 Carolyn Oh focuses on the liberal defense
of the adversary system: "The legal system's focus on the protection
of individual rights and personal liberties reflects the essential and
pervasive cultural value of individualism. The American values of
free-market competition, decentralized and minimized government
intervention, and laissez-faire economics are mirrored in the

80. Scheingold, supra note 74, at 124.
81. Abel, supra note 67 at 1024.

82. STEPHANIE WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 159 (1996).
83. Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River.- A Critique of the
LiberalDefense ofAffirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 960 (2001).
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adversary process." 84 The adversary process is a hybrid of liberal
pretensions and conservative values.
Liberals and progressives share a freedom from that which is
orthodox. It is matter of degree: "Progressive implies an opposition
to the reactionary or backward, a willingness to forsake past methods
85
or beliefs in the interests of improvement or amelioration."
Liberals are reform oriented, gradualist, defending principles of civil
liberties and moderate state intervention. They tend not to favor
transformation and broad scale fundamental change. They tend to
favor inclusion rather than systemic change on a deeper level.
Focusing on individual rights and freedoms from arbitrary
authority, the ACLU is a paradigm liberal advocacy group that
nonetheless does progressive advocacy as well. In the presidential
race between Michael Dukakis and George Bush Sr., Governor
Dukakis was characterized as a card-carrying member of the
ACLU-an attack on his liberal politics.86 I think the ACLU is a
social justice enterprise, but with contradictions. In defense of the
principle of free speech, it would represent Nazis8 7
and
KKK
88
members. On the other hand, in Florida it represents black felons
who have been permanently disenfranchised,8 9 and it seeks to protect
civil liberties from the post 9-11 assault of the Patriot Act and John
Ashcroft. 90

84. Carolyn Jin-Myung Oh, Questioning the Cultural and Gender-Based
Assumptions of the Adversary System: Voices of Asian-American Law
Students, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 125 (1992).
85. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 71, at 1303.
86. E.g., David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factorin Assessing

the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes;
Prediction,No, 73 Miss. L.J. 423, 452 (2003).

87. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
88. E.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
89. E.g., Complaint for Mandamus, Injunctive, and Declaratory Relief, Fla.
Conference

of

Black

State

Legislators

v.

Moore,

available

at

http://www.aclufl.org/egislature-courts/legal-department/briefs-complaints/e
x-felonsvoting-rights.cfi (last visited June 1, 2004).
90. ACLU, PATRIOT [sic] Act FearsAre Stifling Free Speech, ACLU Says
in Challenge to Law,

http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cftn

?ID=13248&c=206 (last visited May 30, 2004).
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C. Centrist

Most people probably feel most comfortable here. It is a
compromising, moderate position. This is a political stance that
values moderation, standing between the extremes of left or right.
Centrists often are seen as pragmatic, but because there is no clear
commitment to values they also are seen as expedient.
In my mind, President Bill Clinton personifies the center. 91 The
center is perhaps the most complex and ambiguous category, for it
really has no solid political program. Often a self-identified
reformist will actually block real reform. An historical example is
Woodrow Wilson. Richard Hofstader notes that in 1911-1912,
Wilson's speeches reflected "a new and more aggressive note, a
ringing demand for change, and yet for change that would preserve
'established purposes and conceptions.' In this idea-that we must
have a forward-looking return to the past-was the link between the
old and the new Wilson. ' ' 92 This is a centrist position that voices
liberal values, but actually preserves "established purposes and
conceptions," the "forward-looking return to the past., 93 This causes
the center to incline to the right rather than to the left. Moreover, the
key characteristic of one at the center is political ambivalence.
As I teach my students, I become increasingly aware that if the
number of social justice lawyers is to grow, we must solidify the
commitment of progressive students. We must move liberal students
as far to the left as they can go and increase their ability to operate
effectively within the constraints of liberalism. We must try to
develop a critical consciousness among those in the center so that
they can resolve their ambivalence and more consistently embrace
legal liberalism, so they may resist being recruited by the right.
D. Conservative
Here, I include neoconservatives, many of whom were formerly
liberals but who lost faith in liberal policies and retreated to the

&

GEORGIA J. SORENSON, DEAD

LEADERSHIP AND

THE PERILS. OF MODERATION

91. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS
CENTER: CLINTON-GORE

(1999).
92. RICHARD

HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND

THE MEN WHO MADE IT

93. Id.

328 (Vintage Books ed. 1989) (1948).
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right.94 Conservatism is a political disposition to preserve what is
established. Often, we mistakenly associate conservatives with
preserving the status quo. But when we identify the Establishment
we are referring to paradigm conservatives-particularly, those with
power or vested interests in maintaining the status quo features of
what has been established as the traditionally dominant societal
organization, institutional arrangements, and cultural habits. Thus,
conservatism is "a political philosophy based on a strong sense of
tradition and social stability, stressing the importance of established
institutions (as religion, property, the family, and class structure),
and preferring gradual development with preservation of the best
elements of the past to abrupt change." 95
Conservatives have rearticulated and redeployed former liberal
legal themes such as "equality of opportunity" and "colorblindness"
in such a manner as to oppose current liberal themes such as
affirmative action. The salient example is Dr. Martin Luther King
Jr.'s hope that the country would measure the quality of individuals
by the content of their character rather than the color of their skins.
Conservative egalitarianism (individual fairness) has supplanted
liberal reform (valuing diversity).
E. Reactionary
Often described in right-wing understatement as conservatives,
reactionaries actually attempt to exert a reciprocal or counteracting
force or influence to those left of them, sometimes including their
conservative allies. A common charge against them is that they want
to "turn back the clock on progress." 96 More than to preserve
today's Establishment-which may have incorporated liberal
changes-reactionaries want to restore a previous set of "established
purposes and conceptions." 97 They want to return to the good old
days, eroding liberal aspects of change in the Establishment. The
political reactionary seeks to return the status quo to a former
political order. This is illustrated by the recent controversy over
94. DAVID BROCK, BLINDED BY THE RIGHT: THE CONSCIENCE OF AN ExCONSERVATIVE 4 (2002).
95. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 7 1, at 177.
96. E.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Fulfill Funding Promise, USA TODAY, Oct.
26, 2003, at A.11.
97. HOFSTADTER, supra note 92, at 328.
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Trent Lott's endorsement of the 1948 Dixiecrat platform of Strom
Thurmond. This was not merely a conservative endorsement; it was
a reactionary one.
Political mapping brings into sharp relief a set of constraints that
are part of the system of lawyers, laws, and politics. Students must
be aware of them and how they constrain lawyers physically and
psychologically under the pressures of role, economics, and limited
opportunities to do social justice work. Students must come to
appreciate that whatever their orientation, the dynamics of
contestation will bear on their efforts and results. They must learn
not only to set an agenda, but also how to resist an opposing agenda.
Presently within law schools the primary political positioning, if not
contestation, centers on the opposing orientations of the American
Constitution Society on the Left and the Federalist Society on the
Right. While the former is embryonic, the latter is tremendously
powerful. As David Brock notes,
The Federalist Society of right-wing lawyers who had been
at the heart of the anti-Clinton conspiracy turned out to be a
virtual Bush government in exile; the new administration's
policies of tax cuts for the wealthy, slashing environmental
protections, and rolling back civil rights bore the Society's
stamp, as did many of Bush's nominees to the federal
bench.98
Those who cry out for social justice most acutely are well aware
of the politics here. We know that around the world many clients
and
communities
of
marginalized,
subordinated,
and
underrepresented people "can resist, do resist and have a rich and full
history of resistance" to injustice. 99 Resistance is no silver bullet,
and it is often romanticized. Yet, client narratives must incorporate
this resistance into stories that educate judges, the bar, and the
public. More importantly,
that resistance can bear on strategic
00
1
advocacy.
planning and
98. BROCK, supra note 94, at 331.

99. Michelle S. Jacobs, Peoplefrom the Footnotes: The Missing Element in
Client-CenteredCounseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 345, 401 (1997).

100. As Michelle Jacobs explains:
As lawyers and students, we must now find ways to understand and to
use the client's resistance on their behalf. We can do this by using
their resistance to reframe legal issues and to assist in developing legal
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V. SOCIAL JUSTICE LAWYERING MOVEMENT
According to Peter Gabel and Paul Harris, "A first-principle of a
'counterhegemonic' legal practice must be to subordinate the goal of
getting people their rights to the goal of building an authentic or
unalienated political consciousness. ' ' l Thus, while rights strategies
are important to social justice practice, as Gabel and Harris note, "the
lawyer should always attempt to reshape the way legal conflicts are
represented in the law, revealing.., 10the
true socioeconomic and
2
political foundations of legal disputes."
A. Preservation-Through-Transformation:The Problem
Reva Siegel describes the historical process of what she calls
"preservation-through-transformation."' ' 3
Siegel explains that
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the legal system in the
United States responded to demands for the equality of women and
colored people with modifications--call it "law reform," perhapsthat began to treat them as equal under law. For most members of
these groups, they appeared historically and formally in law as
holding low status in hierarchical relationships: women to men, and
colored people to white people. According to Siegel,
In gender, race, and class relationships, the legal system
continued to allocate privileges and entitlements in a
manner that perpetuated former systems of express
hierarchy. Analyzed from this vantage point, the rise of
liberal and capitalist systems of social organization did not
result in the dismantlement of status relationships, but
instead precipitated their evolution into new forms. 104
strategy. We can use their resistance to challenge stereotypical
characterizations made by the courts and administrative agencies of
our clients and their lives. We must also begin to understand the
causes of clients' resistance to their lawyers, and where possible,
eliminate the lawyer-created causes of resistance.
Id. at 401-02.
101. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images:
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L.& Soc.
CHANGE 369, 375 (1982).
102. Id. at 376.
103. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-EnforcingState Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).

104. Id. at 1116.
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In effect, Siegel describes an empirical phenomenon as well as a
theory of "preservation-through-transformation" whereby status
hierarchies are preserved not in spite of "transformation" efforts, but
in part because of the justificatory rhetoric that explains and
legitimates them.
As injustice is challenged, social institutions disassociate
themselves from the prior regime and repudiate that rhetoric. The
reality of the status hierarchy, however, has not changed as
significantly as the new rhetoric would suggest. As Kenji Yoshino
observes, "[t]o the contrary, the status hierarchy may be preserved
actors
precisely because the rhetoric has changed, permitting social
05
quo."'
status
the
legitimates
that
narrative
progress
a
to tell
He thus likens the process to a virus: "[T]he status hierarchy
mutates to ensure a longevity that would not have been possible if it
"preservation-throughWhile
static." 10 6
had
remained
possibility
of significant
forecloses
the
transformation" neither
change, nor assumes a constancy of bad intentioned actors, "[i]t
does, however, caution that progress narratives about status
0 7
hierarchies should be approached with intense skepticism."'
Finally, given the material stakes at issue, those in dominant
positions of power or privilege who benefit from status hierarchy
resist the very changes that social justice claims raise. Under these
more
circumstances, the contestation over status hierarchy is "much
10 8
likely to effect rhetorical rather than substantive revision."
The "virus" is manifested in the United States in a variety of
Legal changes have been
anti-subordination movements. 10 9

105. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 825 (2002).
106. Id.

107. Id. at 826.
108. Id.
109. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the DiscriminationModel to Violence
Against Women: Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251, 258 n.36 (2003) (citing Reva B. Siegel, "The
Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117
(1996)); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other than
Race": The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection
Jurisprudence,2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 698 (2003); Kapila Juthani, Police
Treatment ofDomestic Violence and Sexual Abuse: Affirmative Duty to Protect
vs. Fourth Amendment Privacy, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 51, 55 (2003);
Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV.
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significant, at least in the formal sense, and those changes have
certainly improved the lives of people. Yet, because the legal
changes have not gone far enough, have not been sustainable enough
to resist backlash and retrenchment, those changes have not been
fully transformative. That is, they have not eradicated foundational
status structures and systems. Sometimes, we have a tendency to
focus too narrowly on the legal issue and, consequently, law reform
efforts are reduced to stopgap or, increasingly, hold-harmless
measures.
B. The Praxisof ThirdDimension Lawyering
As social justice praxis, Lucie White presents three ideal types
of activist lawyers engaged in social transformation." 0 I want to
examine her analysis as one possible response to the "preservationthrough-transformation" problem that Reva Siegel describes.
White's first dimension of lawyering entails contesting litigation.
This is a fairly straight ahead, rights based form of advocacy. Test
case litigation and law reform litigation are illustrative. The lawyer
seeks broad, sweeping and innovative remedies. The goal is reform,
rather than transformation, and the courtroom is the principal venue.
According to White,
within this image, the lawyer assumes that client groups
perceive their suffering as injuries that can be redressed,
and stand willing to share these perceptions with their
lawyers. It is not the lawyer's role to question the structure
of the law itself, asking whether it sometimes prevents the
lawyer from translating his clients' grievances into good
legal claims. Nor is it his role to question the judicial
system, asking whether it sometimes prevents him from
securing remedies that really work. 1 1
White's second dimension of lawyering involves the use of
litigation as public action with political significance. The law and its
2365, 2410 (2003); Robert Westley, Reparations and Symbiosis: Reclaiming
the Remedial Focus, 71 UMKC L. REV. 419, 428 (2002).
110. Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on

Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699. For an insightful analysis of
White's article and critiques of it, see Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating
CollaborativeLawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 427 (2000).
111. White, supra note 110, at 755.
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practice have cultural meaning; they constitute a discourse-not
merely a discussion-about social justice. The advocacy seeks to
Here, law is "a public
influence public consciousness.
1
'
12
As White explains,
conversation."
the lawyer is not indifferent to victory in court. If a claim
prevails, so much the better. But the measure of the case's
success is not who wins. Rather, success is measured by
such factors as whether the case widens the public
imagination about right and wrong, mobilizes political
action behind new social arrangements, or pressures those
in power to make concessions. To accomplish these goals,
the lawyer must design the case with the audience-the
13
subordinated group and the wider public-in mind."
Finally, third dimension lawyering entails collaborative work
with the client community. Drawing on the work of Paulo Friere and
the parallel feminist method of consciousness raising, this dimension
challenges subordination at the level of the consciousness of the
client community. The third dimension of lawyering involves
helping a group learn how to interpret moments of domination as
opportunities for resistance. 1 4 Thus, the lawyer must engage not
only in dialogue and mutual education, but also in strategic work:
The lawyer must help the client-group devise concrete
actions that challenge the patterns of domination that they
identify. This strategizing is also a learning process.
Through it, the group learns to interpret their relationship
with those in power as an ongoing drama rather than as a
static condition. They learn to interpret the particular
configurations that the oppressor's power takes on over
time and to respond to those changing patterns with
pragmatism and creativity. They learn how to design
context-specific acts of public resistance, which work, not
by overpowering the oppressor, but by revealing the
wrongness and vulnerability of its positions to itself and to
a wider public."15

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 758.
Id. at 758-59.
Id. at 760-61.
Id. at 763.
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White's analysis of the three dimensions of lawyering grows out
of the context of South Africa, where members of a small farming
community struggled against forced relocation under the oppression
of apartheid, so the article is really about a concrete instance of
resistance and organizing against subordination. I ask the students,
"How has legal training prepared you regarding any of White's
dimensions of lawyering?"
The third dimension is, of course, foreign to the traditional
image of the lawyer. Indeed, one does not really need a law degree
or an attorney's license to practice this dimension of advocacy.
White claims that "fluency in the law-that is, a deep practical
understanding of law as a discourse for articulating norms of justice
and an array of rituals for resolving social conflict-will greatly
improve a person's flexibility and effectiveness at 'third dimensional
work'."1 16 1 recently was following a car with a bumper sticker that
read: "Question the Answers." Given the danger that law will shape
work against subordination conservatively, is "fluency in the law"
really an advantage in organizing? My students struggle with this
question, as do 1.117
In the next part, I describe an advocacy tool, the Eastman thick
complaint, a tool that certainly facilitates second dimension
lawyering, and which may also facilitate third dimension lawyering.
Before I describe it, however, I want to be very clear that second
dimension lawyering is high order advocacy. In spite of the
limitations, many of us never get past this dimension, and that is
quite okay. For example, White points to second dimension
lawyering in Nelson Mandela's 1962 trial for terrorism: "He and the
other defendants decided to use the event to speak out to white South
Africans and the world about the injustice of apartheid. This proved
inconsistent with the traditional
strategy of raising technical defenses
11 8
claim."
state's
the
defeat
to

116. Id. at 765.

117. The issue of law and organizing simply adds another significant layer of
complexity. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A CriticalReflection
on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 443 (2001); William P. Quigley,
Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of
Community Organizations,21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 455 (1994).

118. White, supra note 110, at 759 n.217.
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While one should certainly aspire to the third dimension in some
contexts, we should not be hypercritical of second dimension
lawyering. Third dimension lawyering really requires a certain set of
circumstances that facilitates a joint project with clients to translate
felt experience into understanding and actions that can increase their
power. There are groups that are ready to go, whose consciousness
about oppression is well developed and who will advance their cause
very well within second dimension advocacy. Yet, they may need a
third dimension response as well as a second dimension response-a
sort of hybrid response.119
C. HerbertEastman and the Thick Complaint in SocialJustice
Lawyering
Consistent with this view of third dimension lawyering, as an
exercise in my social justice lawyering class I require the students to
draft a federal court complaint on the Herbert Eastman model of
pleading. 20 Eastman provides an example of a "thick complaint"
that contrasts with traditional notice pleading.' 2 1 I intend the
complaint drafting assignment to enable students to use the
complaint as part of third dimension lawyering.
Third dimension lawyering is very hard to do: How does the
lawyer get invited into the client community, and how does she
legitimate her presence beyond mere invitation? Is it enough simply
not to be regnant? How can advocates move beyond the first and
second dimensions?
Even with consciousness raising and
collaboration galore, how do you achieve the transformation that can
only result from the elimination of institutional domination and
119. See generally, PENDA D.
COMMUNITIES

AND

THE

HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS,
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT TO THE

(2001) (six case studies that demonstrate how
civil rights advocates are responding to recent changes in the sociopolitical
ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

landscape).
120. Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil
Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 836-49 (1995). In the past students have
filed complaints against the federal government seeking "spatial reparations;"

against local police for failing to respond adequately to instances of domestic
violence; and against local school boards for failing to protect gay and lesbian
youth from violence and harassment in high school.
121. Pleading rules present an apparent constraint, but not a real one. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a short and plain statement of the
claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 8. This encourages a "thin" complaint.
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oppression? I think the process of professional re-socialization
simply does not reorient students enough, or in time, to move beyond
the second dimension lawyering stage. The complaint assignment,
however, has proven to be a very good, reflective, and self-critical
start for most of them.
Though not a clinician, I take a page from their book here.
Drawing on the insights of two clinical professors, I offer their views
of the value of moving students beyond the traditional realms of
"thinking like a lawyer." Lisa Lerman observes, "Student extems
can cultivate their skills as reflective practitioners. Even if students
become busy lawyers who have little time to ruminate, they will
carry with them the skill of reflective observation."' 22 According to
Jane Aiken,
Clinical legal education has long valued reflection as a key
to effective teaching. Our supervisory questions should be
directed to fostering reflection rather than eliciting
information. As teachers, we must deviate from systemreinforcing behaviors and challenge the students to examine
and reflect upon the prevailing social, political, and cultural
23
realities that affect their own and their clients' lives.'
Within the context of collaborative work along lines of third
dimension lawyering, I ask the students: "How does your filing an
Eastman complaint fit within these themes?"
"Do you have
reservations about these strategies of empowerment?" "What are the
risks of filing a complaint in court-especially a complaint that takes
the radical form of an Eastman complaint?" "What advantages and
disadvantages accompany a focus on the courtroom?" "How can
lawyers be part of a process of exploration and empowerment?"
VI. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS CRITICAL TO TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE:
THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

It is difficult to change positive law and social norms without
the influence of a social movement.' 24 I have learned this lesson in
122. Lisa G. Lerman, Professionaland Ethical Issues in Legal Externships:
Fostering Commitment to Public Service, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2295, 2299
(1999).
123. Aiken, supra note 25, at 298.
124. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L.
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many ways. For many years I served on the Board of Directors of
the New World Foundation, a progressive funder based in New York
City. 12 5 Over the past 50 years, its core mission has been to fund the
movement building process. In closing the present Article, I want to
draw on its experience to discuss why social movements are critical
to social justice. Recently, funding social movements has drawn a
lot of attention within philanthropic circles. This is partly because
"the multiple constituencies and issue areas we fund seem to need
126
the integration, engagement and synergy that movements create."'
Operating within the third dimension, social justice lawyers can be
important players in the movement's integration, engagement, and
synergy. From its longstanding experience, the New World
Foundation observes, "The building of social movements gives us
rich opportunities for practice. For at the heart of every social
movement are people who suffer injustice, who organize to oppose
it, and who must transform themselves, their organizations and
society in order to succeed."' 27 This is very hard to appreciate sitting
within law offices and standing at the lectern in front of our students.
Yet, I know from my own grant making at the Ford Foundation in
the early 1990s, my past association as a board member with the
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, and my present
association as a board member with Oxfam America that successful
social movements "can produce extraordinary
leaps of human
' 128
times."
daunting
most
the
in
progress, even
I know that the people who suffer injustice most acutely are
tough, resilient, and able to survive under the worst of circumstances.
The character and persistence they develop, when translated into a
social movement, is inspiring without romance. As a countervailing
force to governmental and corporate power, becoming a part of
activist social movements for social justice is imperative for lawyers
to heed their public calling in the truest sense. The people who
suffer injustice most acutely have few places from which they are
REV. 2062 (2002). For an excellent panoramic view, see Symposium, Social
Movements andLaw Reform, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001).
125. See http://www.newwf.org (last visited May 30, 2004).
126. NEW WORLD FOUND., FUNDING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE NEW
WORLD FOUNDATION PERSPECTIVE 1 (2003).

127. Id. at 6.
128. Id.
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able to lift their voices and assert their collective strength. Where
this occurs, however, is often through their own organizations and
activism.
Moreover, as the New World Foundation points out, "there are
few ways to act on a scale commensurate with government and
corporate power-to act locally and globally at the same time, to
move regions, states or nations--except through inclusive social
129
movements that grow independently of the prevailing order."'
Within the docket of grant making at the NWF, I have heard these
countervailing voices in programs to organize groups in the South,
advance a new politics of multiracial democracy in California,
support worker organizing for economic justice and human rights,
fund labor-community alliances, and advance an agenda of
environmental justice.
Where and how does the lawyer enter the movement building
and dynamics? William Quigley has analyzed various themes in
community empowerment lawyering, including the primary goal of
building up the community and preventing it from becoming
dependent on lawyers. 130 He suggests that the community must be
involved in everything that the lawyer does, and that the lawyer must
learn community organizing and leadership development.13 1 The
lawyer must never become the leader for the group, and must be
wary of speaking for the group. Lawyers must be aware of how
much they are taking as well as giving, and must be
willing, to
32
confront their own comfort with an unjust legal system. 1
For my students, I think the most basic theme deals with
their social distance from marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented clients and communities. Quigley correctly points to the
necessity to be willing to "journey with the community."' 3 3 This
means that the lawyer must learn to join rather than lead, to listen
rather than to speak, and "to assist people in empowering
themselves
134
them."'
for
power
of
levers
the
rather than manipulating

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Quigley, supra note 117, at 464-65.
Id. at471-74.
Id. at 474-78.
Id. at478.
Id. at 479.
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Quigley takes this notion from Barbara Major, an African
American organizer who works with numerous low-income women's
groups in the southern United States.
Major argues that
"empowerment" occurs "when a person or group of people know
who they are, accept who they are, and refuse to let people make
them anything else."' 35 She notes, moreover, that rather than
working "in community,"' 136 we should think more about working
"with community."' 37 Working with the community is what she
means by "journey[ing] with the community":
This journey has to involve the community really getting a
sense of who they are, in the sense of beginning to
understand their own power. In working with community
the wisdom or the knowledge of the lawyer does not
outweigh the wisdom and
the knowledge of the community,
138
about itself especially.
VII. CONCLUSION

In this Article I have discussed the need to focus specific
attention of our pedagogy, scholarship, and activist collaboration on
the problem of social injustice as we seek to teach and learn about
social justice lawyering. Now is the time to advance the social
justice agenda and to bring the topic more directly into our
classrooms and students' lives. In order to do so we must reverse
what Duncan Kennedy has described legal education to be-training
for hierarchy. 139 We must take seriously the need to re-socialize
those students who seek to pursue social justice work because, as
Gerald L6pez correctly observes, "in many ways both current and
past lawyers fighting for social change and all with whom they
collaborate ... have had to face trying to learn how largely to
' 40
overcome rather than to take advantage of law school experience.'

135. Id. at 461.

136. Id. at 462.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF

HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM, at i-ii (1983).
140. Gerald P. Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV.
1,2(1989).
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Not only must we reorient our students as professionals, but we
must also teach new lessons in new ways. We must provide an
enabled opportunity and greater ability for them to work with those
who are marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented to bring
social justice to their homes, workplaces, schools, streets, and
communities-to their lives. There is much work to do and the
wrong side is winning too many battles. Still, I am hopeful that
tomorrow's new day will arrive shortly.
In 1992, I served on this law school's faculty. I submitted a
tenure piece on Archie Shepp and Critical Race Theory in which I
wrote of the difficulty I had in bringing my 101 page, 388 footnoted
article to a close. I determined that part of the difficulty was an
audience problem:
When all is said and done, this writing is probably for my
children, 10 year-old Jonathan and 6 year-old Canai, and
for their rainbow of little friends, associates, and peers, who
at this time cannot really appreciate fully what I have
struggled to write here. Perhaps the slim
hope, however,
' 41
replacement."'
"cohort
in
lie
indeed
does
As I write this, young Jonathan is now a first-year law school
student, and young Canai is a college freshman. I would have hoped
for more progress since that earlier time when I placed my hope in
them. Yet the issues remain, though now they are more urgent. I
must repeat what I wrote in 1992:
The nation's pressing challenge, I think, lies in us adults
providing good answers to questions like these: Can this
one nation under God continue as presently constituted and
oriented without burning out or burning up before Jonathan,
Canai, and their group can position themselves to improve
the situation? When they are able, will they still be willing,
as they are now when left to their own devices, to reconcile
human differences? Will they properly recognize those
differences as culturally and socially constructed
determinants of value that place a disproportionately high
premium on whiteness, elitism, maleness, high income, or
141. John 0. Calmore, CriticalRace Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Authentic IntellectualLife in a Multicultural World, 65 SO. CAL.

L. REv. 2129, 2229 (1992).
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wealth? Will enough of them reject the pursuit of life,
liberty, and happiness that is so constricted by a material
aggrandizement secured at the expense of social relations
that value people, cooperation, inclusive community, and
true broad access to the realization, finally, of America's
high positive ideals? Can we save the children
so that they
142
nation?
the
save
to
chance
their
have
will
In Grutter v. Bollinger,' 43 the University of Michigan Law
School affirmative action case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote,
"We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will
144
no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."
This Article has shown that we are running out of time, and not only
because of Justice O'Connor's time-bomb jurisprudence.

142. Id.
143. 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
144. Id. at 342.
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